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ABSTRACT
Labour market policies are multi-dimensional: their design depends on factors
such as generosity, coverage, the combination of active and passive elements,
and overall cost. Political conﬂict on one dimension often hides agreement on
others, and social groups possibly care about different aspects of policies.
However, most empirical studies treat policy preferences as unidimensional.
This article utilizes a novel experimental conjoint design to assess how ﬁve
dimensions affect support for labour market policies in Spain. It also assesses
if individuals’ self-interest and ideology affect the importance of each
dimension for support for a policy. We ﬁnd that individuals’ support depends
mostly on the generosity of policies for the most destitute and on funding.
We also ﬁnd that ideology shapes which dimensions of policy citizens care
most about, but economic self-interest does not. Importantly, our
experimental design can be applied to study preferences for different social
policies.
KEY WORDS Conjoint; experiments; labour market policies; multi-dimensionality; policy preferences;
Spain
Introduction
The Great Recession has brought conﬂicts over labour market policy (LMP) to
the forefront. Particularly in Southern Europe, systems of social protection are
insufﬁciently equipped to deal with the unemployment crisis, while public
ﬁnances do not leave much leeway for reform. At the same time, increasing
ethnic diversity and ‘dual’ labour markets may reduce social solidarity. It is fre-
quently argued that divergence in the probability of becoming unemployed
across social groups undermines support for LMP by those in more secure
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positions. Against this background, debates about LMP in Europe are increas-
ingly complex (Beramendi et al. 2015; Rueda 2005). Public support arguably
depends on speciﬁc features of policies such as how generous beneﬁts are,
who is eligible, and how costs are funded.
While much academic work has been devoted to understanding public
preferences for LMP, it rarely reﬂects these complexities (Cusack et al. 2006;
Margalit 2013; Rehm 2009; Rueda 2005, 2006). Instead, most studies analyse
LMP preferences in a one-dimensional framework that can neither assess
the relative importance of different considerations in mobilizing support for
LMP, nor whether this relative importance varies predictably across citizens.
The goal of this article is to contribute to an emerging research agenda on
multi-dimensional preferences. Speciﬁcally, we propose a framework that
enables researchers to address two pertinent questions: which policy dimen-
sion is most important in determining support or rejection of LMP reform pro-
posals; and do citizens differ systematically in which policy dimension they
prioritize?
Studying preferences over multiple policy dimensions is a methodological
challenge. Following recent advances in political science (Bechtel and Scheve
2013; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Hainmueller et al. 2014), we use a con-
joint experiment that simultaneously varies ﬁve characteristics of a policy. This
allows us to compare on a common scale how different LMP dimensions
affect support for a reform proposal. While previous experimental studies
into LMP preferences have manipulated the characteristics of individual reci-
pients (e.g., Petersen et al. 2010), to the best of our knowledge no prior
research has manipulated different characteristics of LMP.
We conduct our experiment in Spain, a country in which LMP reform has
ranked high on the political agenda for decades and which was hit particularly
hard by the Great Recession. Although Spain is not a typical case, debates
about LMP are particularly relevant there. We ﬁnd that respondents care
mostly about the distributive effects of policies. Programmes targeted at
the most needy are preferred over universal programmes. How the reform
is funded also shapes preferences: expanding LMP at the expense of other
social policies is unpopular, but trade-offs are accepted when defence and
police spending are cut. This suggests that a previously understudied dimen-
sion of trade-offs with other expenditures is a strong determinant of LMP
support.
In addition, we ﬁnd that Spanish citizens are surprisingly homogeneous in
their prioritization of LMP dimensions regardless of income, education and
labour-market situations. Most notably, the rich and securely employed do
not care more about costs than other groups. From the perspective of
insider–outsider and dualization theory (Palier and Thelen 2010; Rueda
2006), this is a surprising ﬁnding. By contrast, we ﬁnd that left–right ideology
affects respondents’ LMP priorities. This supports the growing literature
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arguing that ideology trumps economic interests when predicting attitudes
towards redistributive and insurance programmes.
Our results are directly relevant for the literature on LMP preferences
that predominantly assumes uni-dimensionality without subjecting it to
empirical scrutiny. In addition, we make a broader methodological contri-
bution to public policy research. Given that experiments are still underu-
tilized in this area, we point out a fruitful avenue for how they can
contribute to tackling methodological challenges related to multi-dimen-
sionality. We thereby identify a tool that will be useful for public and social
policy research beyond the present case of LMPs. Finally, our results are
substantively important for policy-makers. In times of scarce resources,
it is important to know around which dimension consensual reform
packages can be designed.
Dimensionality of LMP preferences1
Using uni-dimensional dependent variables to measure LMP preferences is
the standard in the literature (cf. Cavaille and Trump 2015). The underlying
assumption is that citizens can be placed on a continuum between strong
and weak support for LMPs. However, this simplifying assumption is funda-
mentally at odds with the theories dominating research on social and
labour market policies. In the social policy literature, multi-dimensionality of
the welfare state and speciﬁc policies is explicitly theorized. We cannot
review this extensive literature here and only point to some of its core
arguments.
As Esping-Andersen (1990) has famously claimed, welfare states cannot be
neatly placed on a uni-dimensional continuum between small and large; they
cluster in regimes based on qualitative differences on several dimensions.
Relatedly, a large literature on reform politics claims that welfare state
change requires reconciling interests of different groups with different priori-
ties on different policy dimensions (Breunig and Busemeyer 2012; Esping-
Andersen 1985; Häusermann 2010; Korpi and Palme 1998). Concretely, LMP
reforms are often achieved through compensating ‘losers’ on one dimension
with expansion on another (Jensen et al. 2014; Knotz and Lindvall 2014).
Two prominent examples for multi-dimensional LMP conﬂicts come from
the literatures on insider–outsider politics (Palier and Thelen 2010; Rueda
2005, 2006) and welfare chauvinism (van Kersbergen and Schumacher forth-
coming). Both approaches argue that a privileged group (natives; insiders)
favour generous protection in principle, but only in conjunction with
limited coverage so they do not have to ﬁnance protection for other
groups (immigrants; outsiders). Hence, dualism and welfare chauvinism are
example for LMP reform options that cannot be captured by a simple
more-or-less spending logic.
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In sum, what the policy literature suggests is that (a) LMPs consist of differ-
ent dimensions; (b) social groups and political actors differ in how they prior-
itize these dimensions; and (c) policy change is a complex process in which
actors exploit the multi-dimensionality of LMPs for political bargains. The
uni-dimensional approach to LMP preferences cannot give justice to this
complexity.
An emerging literature acknowledges that welfare-state or redistribution
preferences are multi-dimensional (Cavaille and Trump 2015; Roosma et al.
2013; Roosma et al. 2014). However, these contributions are limited to
broad distinctions (e.g., between normative support and performance evalu-
ations). Moreover, they address the question of whether preferences are multi-
dimensional. We know close to nothing about which dimensions of a single
policy (LMP in our case) is most decisive in determining support. Moreover,
despite the heavy emphasis of this point in the policy literature, there is no
research on individual differences in priorities. This means that there are no
readily available theories on which to base our analysis. It is beyond the
scope of this article to develop an original theory of multi-dimensional
policy preferences. Rather, the goal is to develop a framework that can
guide more comprehensive theoretical efforts in the future.
Which LMP dimension is most important?
As most policies, LMPs are bundles of multiple measures. Which dimensions
matter most for LMP support has – to our knowledge – not been theorized
explicitly. We therefore adopt an explorative approach. To make a theoreti-
cally informed choice of which dimensions to include in our analysis, the
seminal work of Esping-Andersen (1990: 47–8) is a good starting point.
Regarding passive LMPs, he distinguishes as central components income
replacement, beneﬁt duration, eligibility criteria and range of entitlements.
These are still prominent variables to operationalize unemployment beneﬁts
(Pallage et al. 2013; Scruggs 2006). The ﬁrst two dimensions can be subsumed
under beneﬁt generosity, while the latter two can be subsumed under coverage
of beneﬁts. It is conceivable that some citizens prefer wide coverage but only
limited generosity. Conversely, workers might prefer generous beneﬁts but
only if coverage is limited to a core group.
While generosity and coverage are important to capture differences across
passive LMPs, another important dimension is the relative emphasis of active
LMPs (ALMPs), such as training programmes for the unemployed (Beramendi
et al. 2015). Indeed, countries differ strongly in how much of LMP resources
they channel into such training (Bonoli 2011). Patterns of ALMP support might
be very different than for beneﬁt generosity. For instance, employers and
upscale employees who reject generous beneﬁts might support training invest-
ments because they contribute to a better skilled pool of job seekers. Similarly,
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the pro-welfare working class might be divided on ALMPs depending on whether
workers are in standard or non-standard jobs (Beramendi et al. 2015; Rueda 2006).
Finally, an important question is how expensive LMP reforms are and how the
reform is funded. Although citizens generally are aware of the budgetary trade-
offs created through additional spending (Hansen 1998), we know little about
which costs and which precise trade-offs they are willing to accept for LMP
expansion. Funds could be generated by increases in taxes or contributions,
by cutting other expenditure, or through debt. Although there are, again, no
straightforward theoretical predictions, it is reasonable to expect that even citi-
zens who support an expansion of LMPs in principle differ in their tolerance of
costs and in their preferred mode of ﬁnancing the reform. Following Jensen
(2012), it is for instance unlikely that the average citizen (who faces modest
unemployment risk) supports LMP at the expense of ‘life course-related’ spend-
ing (e.g., for education or health care).
In sum, we include the following four dimensions in our analysis:
(1) beneﬁt generosity, which can be decomposed into initial beneﬁt level and
the duration of eligibility;
(2) coverage, which can be limited by making beneﬁts conditional on means
tests, citizenship, or insurance record;
(3) human-capital intensity, which is a function of the relative importance of
training programmes for the unemployed;
(4) costs and funding, which includes absolute costs as well as the trade-offs
these costs create with other expenditures.
Individual differences: theories of LMP conﬂict
The second research question is whether citizens differ systematically in
which policy dimension they prioritize. Deriving predictions for this question
is a challenge, because potential theoretical starting points are at the same
time scarce and abundant: there are few explicit arguments about LMP prefer-
ences in a multi-dimension framework, but there are countless theories in the
wider political science literature from which such arguments could be derived.
We therefore proceed in a selective way and demonstrate the usefulness of
our framework with a limited set of moderators that are prominent explana-
tory variables in the literature on policy preferences: income; risk; education;
and ideology. We do not discuss how each moderator interacts with each
dimension introduced above, because of the large number of combinations
this would produce. Because a fully developed theory of (heterogeneity in)
multi-dimensional policy preferences is currently lacking, the literature
offers little guidance here. What we can show, however, is that in our multi-
dimensional framework we can derive more nuanced hypotheses from
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implicitly multi-dimensional theories. We illustrate this for insider–outsider
theory (Palier and Thelen 2010; Rueda 2005, 2006).
As a basic starting point, we note that individual policy preferences are
shaped by two main forces: economic self-interest and ideology.
Explanations based on economic self-interest suggest that individuals will
care about policy dimensions that directly beneﬁt or cost them. Those
exposed to above-average unemployment risk should support generous
LMP, because they expect to get more out than they pay in (Jensen 2012;
Moene and Wallerstein 2003; Rehm 2009). In this perspective, low income
and high employment risk are the main determinants of LMP support. This
expectation can be reﬁned when the multi-dimensionality of LMPs is taken
into account. Poor respondents and respondents exposed to risk should prior-
itize dimensions related to beneﬁt generosity. They should also prioritize
redistributive ways of ﬁnancing beneﬁts; that is, through increases in
income tax. Preferences of rich and secure respondents, on the other hand,
should be affected to a stronger degree by the cost dimension and they
should prefer less redistributive ways of funding beneﬁts, such as spending
cuts or increases in consumption taxes. At the same time, middle and high
incomes should be more averse to cutting social services for which take up
is typically skewed towards the middle class, e.g., education and health care
(Jensen 2012).
As noted above, dualization and insider–outsider theory argue that it is not
so much generosity that divides the secure and the insecure, but coverage.
Insiders support generous beneﬁts, as long as outsiders are pushed into
second-tier beneﬁts with lower generosity (Palier and Thelen 2010). Rueda
(2006) adds that insiders and outsiders should disagree over human-capital
intensity, because training is costly and unlikely to beneﬁt insiders. On the
contrary, the resulting increase in the supply of skilled labour might put
their wages under pressure. Hence, we would expect that outsiders (as
opposed to insiders) prioritize expanding coverage and ALMPs, but that
they do not dissent on the generosity of beneﬁts. Because research on outsi-
ders’ policy preferences is generally uni-dimensional (e.g., Burgoon and
Dekker 2010; Marx 2014; Rueda 2005), this implication of insider–outsider
theory has not been tested yet.
A second set of explanations focuses on how non-material factors shape
economic attitudes (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Benabou and Tirole 2011;
Fong 2001; Linos and West 2003). Among those, the role of ideology stands
out as the most powerful predictor of attitudes toward LMP (Margalit 2013).
In Spain, left–right ideology is the main attitudinal factor driving political
behaviour (Fraile and Lewis-Beck 2012). Previous studies emphasize that
material and non-material factors are not mutually exclusive, because material
factors can shape ideology and other attitudes. However, the correlation
between income and economic issue positions is rather weak across countries
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(de la O and Rodden 2008), suggesting that material interests do not fully
determine ideology. Other factors such as socialization, religiosity and person-
ality play an important role (Jost et al. 2009). How can ideology be expected to
affect the relative importance of LMP dimensions?
Left-wing ideology emphasizes solidarity, redistribution and social equality,
and should therefore lead to attaching more weight to the generosity of
beneﬁts. Right-wing positions traditionally distrust the state as a provider of
services and give a higher priority to limiting the ﬁscal burden of policies.
Hence, high costs of programmes may be seen as positive or not relevant
by left-wing people, while the costs of programme should have a strong nega-
tive effect on support among right-wing citizens.
Moreover, left-wing and right-wing ideologies differ in their afﬁnities to
funding models. Left economic ideology is inﬂuenced by Keynesianism, which
provides a rationale for government debt as stimulator of the economy. More-
over, left-wing ideology is supportive of redistribution and thus favours
income tax increases. Right-wing ideology, on the other hand, dictates low
taxes to provide incentives for economic performance, and challenges Keyne-
sian interventions ﬁnanced through debt. In sum, we expect that respondents
with left-wing ideology prioritize dimensions that contribute to social equality
(beneﬁt generosity and coverage) and social mobility (human-capital intensity).
Moreover, the prospect of high costs, taxes and public debt should do little to
deter their support. These latter dimensions should be the main negative deter-
minants for LMP support among respondents with right-wing ideology.
While we derive our expectations about ideological divides from ﬁndings
of the literature on economic preferences, it is important to note that previous
research has found relatively little partisan disagreement on support for the
welfare state in Spain (Fernández-Albertos and Manzano 2012), making this
a hard case to ﬁnd a direct or moderating effect of ideology on preferences
for LMP reform. Moreover, ideology may be less relevant during economic
crises, because also conservatives support LMPs (Margalit 2013). Also this
would suggest a relatively weak role of ideology in the case of Spain.
The Spanish context
Spain is one of the countries most affected by the Great Recession. In the ﬁrst
quarter of 2014, about 5.93 million people were unemployed according to the
Labour Force Survey.2 Only about 2.5 million persons received some form of
unemployment beneﬁt. Hence, large numbers of actually unemployed
persons did not receive any form of beneﬁt. Low coverage might be related
to restrictive eligibility criteria for unemployment beneﬁts that tend to
exclude the numerous non-standard workers in the Spanish labour market.
LMP is one of the largest sources of social expenditures. In 2013 the annual
public spending on unemployment beneﬁts, including both beneﬁts linked to
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contributions and other subsidies, was close to 30 billion euros and the
budget for professional training in 2014 is roughly 2 billion euros.
The basic structure of the beneﬁts in Spain is as follows: in the ﬁrst six
months after becoming unemployed people receive a contributory beneﬁt
of 70 per cent of the salary they earned in the past 180 days. After that,
they receive 50 per cent of the previous salary. Beneﬁt duration is usually
limited to two years. After the regular beneﬁt is exhausted, the unemployed
may receive means-tested social assistance of 426 euros. This subsidy is
known as the last resort in the social-safety net.
Overall, the Spanish economic and institutional context clearly limits the
generalizability of our ﬁndings, although they possibly bear relevance for
other Southern European countries that share similar welfare institutions and
labour market problems (Crouch 2015). In the conclusions, we will discuss
how the results could be inﬂuenced by idiosyncrasies of the Spanish situation.
Data and methods
To assess the effect of LMP dimensions, we designed a conjoint experiment
embedded in an online survey (conducted April–May 2014 by Netquest) of
a representative sample of 1,508 respondents older than 18 years. The
Online Appendix provides further details and a comparison of sample charac-
teristics with a survey from the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research.
Design of the conjoint experiment
Conjoint experiments were developed in marketing and are increasingly used
in political science. Generally, respondents are presented with two alterna-
tives and are asked to choose between them (Hainmueller et al. 2014). The
description of the alternatives includes several dimensions. For each dimen-
sion there are several possible attributes. By randomly varying attributes,
researchers can compare the importance respondents assign to each attribute
on the same scale.
We asked respondents to choose between two different policy proposals
that differed in their design. The instructions read: ‘There is some talk about
reforming current unemployment policies. Suppose there are two proposals
with the following characteristics, which proposal would you prefer?’ The
task was repeated so that each respondent made two choices.
The experiment randomly varied ﬁve features of LMP related to the dimen-
sions discussed above: beneﬁt structure and generosity, training, target popu-
lation, costs, and ﬁnancing.3 (question wording and example for treatment in
the online supplemental data).
To minimize fatigue and lack of attention, the experiment was presented
very early in the questionnaire and a prompt motivated respondents to
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read the content thoroughly. The number of ﬁve dimensions is actually below
similar conjoint experiments on policy which use six (Bechtel and Scheve
2013) or even nine dimensions (Hainmueller et al. 2014).
In designing the experiment, we were confronted with a trade-off between
theoretical concepts and realism. We decided to vary issues that typically
feature in Spanish policy debates. An important advantage of prioritizing
realism when choosing the alternatives is that respondents can more easily
understand the alternative options and position themselves meaningfully.
Realism also facilitates relevance for policy-makers.
In the beneﬁt structure dimension, the baseline condition is the current
system described above. The other attributes propose increasing generosity.
One attribute extends the duration of non-contributory beneﬁts by four
additional months. This beneﬁts those at risk of long-term unemployment.
We expect the currently unemployed, non-standard workers, the poor and
the low-skilled to support this last-resort beneﬁt extension. Because it is the
most redistributive proposal, respondents with left-wing ideology should
support it as well. The other two attributes increase replacement rates of con-
tributory beneﬁts – either by raising the initial level (by 20 per cent in the ﬁrst
three months) or their duration (maintaining replacement rates at 70 per cent
after six months of unemployment instead of reducing it to 50 per cent as is
currently the case).4 According to dualization theory, these options should be
less attractive for insiders who are highly protected and are unlikely to lose
their jobs in Spain than for outsiders who are more likely to become
unemployed.
The second dimension modiﬁes beneﬁt coverage. In our treatments, recipi-
ents could be any resident in Spain (universal); only Spanish citizens (welfare
chauvinistic); members of households with incomes below the mean salary; or
members of households where no one receives a salary or pension (targeted).
All else equal, programmes targeted at the very poor are more redistributive
than universal programmes, but they can also elicit less broad support (Korpi
and Palme 1998). Although in Spain welfare chauvinism is not as prominent as
it is in other European countries, excluding non-citizens may be popular with
natives who are in competition for resources, i.e., the poor and labour market
outsiders.
The third dimension focuses on human capital intensity. Training pro-
grammes for the unemployed could remain as they are or be expanded.
From a self-interest perspective, those with low skills, high unemployment
risk and the unemployed can expect to beneﬁt more from training pro-
grammes than the securely employed. From an ideology perspective, we
expect that right-wing respondents have negative attitudes toward training
provided by trade unions and prefer private provision. In the case of expan-
sion, we therefore also vary providers: public employment services; compa-
nies; or trade unions. Provision is a key issue in the implementation of the
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reform, which has some salience because trade unions have repeatedly been
involved in scandals about misappropriating training funds.
Costs of the programme could be 100, 1,000, 2,000 or 3,000 million euros.
These quantities are realistic, both in relationship to the overall budget and by
estimating the actual cost of the reforms proposed in the other dimensions.
From a self-interest perspective, we expect people with low unemployment
risk care more about costs than respondents in or at risk of unemployment.
From an ideology perspective, cost should have a stronger negative effect
for right-wing respondents than for left-wing respondents.
The ﬁve attributes of the funding dimension are increasing the value-added
tax, increasing the income tax, increasing public debt, cutting education and
health spending, or cutting spending on police, external affairs and defence.
We expect insiders and the rich to care more about trade-offs than outsiders
and the poor because they are more likely to contribute and less likely to
beneﬁt directly from LMPs. As noted above, right-wing respondents can be
expected to show relatively strong opposition to higher taxes and public debt.
Empirical models
In order to analyse the data, we restack the data matrix so that each proposal k
of task j presented to respondent i is a different row. The 1,508 respondents
were presented with two tasks and there were two alternative proposals per
task, hence generating a total of 6,032 observations.
First, we are interested in the marginal effect of an attribute on support for
the reform. We use a linear regression model to estimate elasticities. If respon-
dents care intensely about one dimension, some attributes will predict
support for a policy proposal compared to the baseline level. We regress
the dependent variable, support for a reform proposal, on a series of
dummy variables that take the value of one if respondents were exposed to
the respective attribute. The models hence take the form:
yijk = X ijkb+ eijk (1)
Whether respondent i chooses proposal k in task j is modeled as a function of
X ijk , a vector containing the attributes of the policy proposal presented to the
respondent in that task. We cluster standard errors by respondent. As Hain-
mueller et al (2014) demonstrate, the average change in the probability of
selecting an alternative caused by the inclusion of each attribute can be esti-
mated using a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regression. 5
In addition to the average effects in the whole sample, we ask whether the
relative importance of different attributes varies across respondents, depend-
ing on their self-interest and their ideology. We examine this in two different
ways. First, we report the results of analyses that interact the attributes with
the individual-level characteristic zi . We run a series of models in which, in
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addition to the full vector of attributes, we also include one individual-level
characteristic zi at a time and the interaction of this moderating variable
and each attribute. The interactive terms test if the importance of an attribute
varies across respondents depending on their individual-level characteristics.
The models take the form:
yijk = X ijkb+ zig+ X ijkzid+ eijk (2)
where an individual’s choice of a policy proposal is modelled as a function of a
vector X of attributes, one individual-level characteristic zi (for instance pos-
ition in the left-right scale), and the interaction between zi and this attribute.
If, for instance, right-wing respondents place more weight on reducing the
cost of a reform than left-wing respondents, we expect a negative interaction
coefﬁcient between ideology (larger values stand for right-wing positions)
and higher costs.
Second, in the Online Appendix, we undertake split-sample analyses and
report separate results for three values of each individual-level characteristic
zi (e.g., for low, middle and high income). This approach does not rely on inter-
active terms and allows us to report all coefﬁcients graphically in one panel.
Results
LMP dimensions and attributes
Which LMP attributes are most important in determining support? Figure 1
shows our estimates of the effect of each attribute on support for a reform
programme, pooling over all respondents. As explained above, the regression
estimates are a measure of the average relative importance of each attribute.
The interpretation of the effects is relative to the reference category in each
dimension.
Respondents clearly care about the generosity of the beneﬁts. Overall, they
prefer any reform extending beneﬁts over a reform maintaining the status
quo. We estimate that extending the 426 euros subsidy after the end of the
beneﬁts for four additional months increases support for a proposal by 10 per-
centage points relative to the baseline of no change in beneﬁt generosity.
Coverage also plays a role as a driver of support for policy proposals, but
the effect is smaller. Relative to a universal programme that includes all resi-
dents in Spain, targeting the policy to members of households in which no
member receives a salary or pension increases support for the reform. This
suggests that respondents support means-tested programmes aimed at the
most needy. There is no evidence of welfare chauvinistic support for exclud-
ing immigrants.
Respondents marginally prefer programmes that increase the human
capital intensity of LMPs over programmes that maintain the status quo,
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but only if such programmes are not provided by trade unions. Providing
more training through the public employment services or in companies
increases support for the programme slightly. It is noteworthy that training
provided in trade unions does not increase support for the programme rela-
tive to the baseline of no changes in training. This result probably reﬂects the
distrust of the population towards trade unions. The largest unions have been
accused of ﬁnancing their activities illegally through training funds. The rela-
tive lack of importance of active LMPs should be contextualized: Spanish
unemployment is particularly high among young people who are often
highly educated. Providing even more education may not be seen as an effec-
tive remedy to unemployment when structural unemployment is high.
The costs of the programme are not very important at predicting support
for a proposal. Although support is somewhat smaller for programmes that
cost 1,000, 2,000, or 3,000 million euros relative to the baseline of 100
euros, the effect sizes are small and not statistically signiﬁcant. Respondents
may be cross-pressured on this question. On the one hand, respondents
may not like the prospect of large new programmes, which need to be
Figure 1. Average treatment effects in the conjoint experiment.
Notes: The dots represent the effect of an attribute on the probability of choosing a pro-
posal, as estimated from a linear probability model with clustered standard errors at the
respondent level. The bars are 95 per cent conﬁdence intervals. A point without a bar
indicates the baseline category of each dimension.
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funded. The conjoint experiment reminds them of the trade-offs involved by
presenting alternative ways to fund the programme. On the other hand,
most respondents support increases in spending on unemployment beneﬁts
when asked in the abstract, omitting trade-offs. In a separate question, we
asked whether spending on unemployment beneﬁts should increase or
decrease. Only 9 per cent of respondents want spending to decrease, 26
per cent prefer spending to stay the same, and fully 67 per cent want spend-
ing to increase. This self-reported preference, however, does not directly
translate to increased support for more expensive programmes in the con-
joint experiment. Hence, respondents seem ambivalent in their attitude
toward costs.
The main driver of support is funding and the involved trade-offs with
effect sizes larger than any other treatment. There is a visible gradient
showing which forms of funding respondents prefer. A reform funded by
spending cuts in education and health is strongly disliked and reduces
support by 20 percentage points compared to the baseline of increases in
consumption tax. This a very large effect compared to the other treatments.
Only funding by spending cuts in police and defence have a similar magni-
tude. This attribute increases support for the reform by 20 percentage
points relative to the baseline. Two other funding options are relatively
popular relative to funding through consumption taxes: increasing the
income tax and increasing public debt.
Overall, we conclude from this ﬁrst analysis that respondents care about
different dimensions of a policy when choosing between reforms presented
as bundles of features. Spanish citizens support increases in the generosity
of programmes and they mainly prefer redistributive programmes and pro-
grammes targeted to the poor. They appear rather ambivalent about the
absolute costs, with no clear difference between more expensive or less
expensive programmes, but are highly sensitive to how programmes are
funded. The conjoint experiment enables a novel discovery. The exact
trade-offs involved in funding social policies is a previously understudied
factor that strongly drives support or rejection of speciﬁc reforms, much
more so than abstract considerations about the total monetary costs of pol-
icies. Substantive arguments about how to prioritize different social policies
and how to fund them with taxes seem more likely to affect public opinion
than abstract costs.
Individual differences in relative importance
Does the importance given to the attributes vary depending on the interests
and ideology of the respondents? First, we examine the individual-level
characteristics related to self-interest: socioeconomic status, labour market
status and risk.
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We consider six moderator variables: having a temporary rather than a per-
manent employment contract; being unemployed rather than employed on a
permanent contract; occupational unemployment rates; subjective unem-
ployment risk; household income; and education (see Appendix C in the sup-
plemental data for details). The interaction coefﬁcients are obtained from
multiplying the variable of interest and each attribute. As usual, the estimates
of interaction models should not be interpreted in isolation (Brambor et al.
2006; Franzese and Kam 2009). Because of the large number of models, we
present the results in the Online Appendix (Table C1).
We regard this analysis as a relevant test of insider–outsider theory and risk
theories of economic preferences. If people with different labour market
status and risk patterns are indistinguishable in their preferences for different
features of LMPs, we must conclude that insider and outsider status has less
explanatory power than suggested by these theories. Importantly, we do not
claim that insiders and outsiders should differ in their opinion about all
dimensions of policies. However, if material-interest-based theories have
some merit, then we should expect labour market situation to have at least
some discriminatory power at predicting support for policy proposals that
directly affect the interests of different groups. Importantly, the results are
robust to the inclusion of a full set of sociodemographic and economic
covariates.6
While the models include a large number of coefﬁcients, the main con-
clusion from the analysis is that respondents’ socioeconomic situation does
not inﬂuence the weight they place on speciﬁc policy attributes when choos-
ing between proposals. Very few of the interaction coefﬁcients reported in the
second column of Table C1 (in the Online Appendix) are signiﬁcant,
suggesting that socioeconomic variables do not moderate the impact of pro-
gramme characteristics on support for the programme. Overall, respondents
with different socioeconomic situations seem to have similar priorities. For
instance, contrary to our predictions, higher economic costs do not reduce
support for a proposal more among respondents with a permanent contract
than among outsiders. We ﬁnd similar null results for various hypotheses
derived from self-interest arguments (only one signiﬁcant interactive term
out of 18 for the generosity dimension and one out of 18 for the funding
dimension). The small number of signiﬁcant interaction terms is not greatly
different from what could be obtained by chance alone.
The results of the conjoint experiment suggest that economic self-interest
does not affect the weight citizens attach to different aspects of a policy pro-
posal. Knowing a person’s socioeconomic situation does not help us predict
which dimension is most important for this person. This ﬁnding is striking,
given that respondents in different labour market and unemployment risk
situations can expect to beneﬁt from unemployment policies to a very differ-
ent extent.
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After establishing the lacking explanatory power of material explanations,
we turn to the analysis of non-economic factors. Table 1 presents the results of
a model interacting attributes with left–right ideology.
Ideology does moderate the effect of various attributes. In particular, it
shapes the importance given to costs and funding. Support among left-
wing respondents increases when the reform is funded through public
debt. The positive effect of debt funding declines and eventually reverses
Table 1. Ideology as a moderator of treatment effects.




Longer 426 euros subsidy 0.128*** –0.007
(Ref. no change in beneﬁts) (0.031) (0.007)
Increase at start 0.025 0.004
(0.031) (0.007)
Constant beneﬁts after 6 months 0.057* –0.003
(0.033) (0.008)
Coverage
Recipients only Spanish citizens 0.060* –0.006
(Ref. all residents) (0.032) (0.007)
Below median salary 0.062* –0.007
(0.032) (0.007)
No salary in household 0.045 –0.010
(0.032) (0.007)
Human capital intensity
Training by public services –0.087*** 0.016**
(Ref. no change in training) (0.031) (0.007)
Training in companies –0.018 0.004
(0.031) (0.007)
Training in trade unions 0.046 –0.002
(0.031) (0.007)
Costs
1,000 million –0.016 –0.001
(Ref. 100 million) (0.032) (0.007)
2,000 million 0.022 –0.014*
(0.031) (0.007)
3,000 million 0.033 –0.014**
(0.031) (0.007)
Sources of funding
Income tax 0.139*** –0.006
(Ref. consumption taxes) (0.038) (0.008)
Public debt 0.178*** –0.026***
(0.038) (0.009)
Education and health –0.280*** 0.022***
(0.035) (0.008)






Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The entries are logistic regression coefﬁcients with clustered
standard errors in parentheses estimated from four regression models.
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among right-wing respondents. The predicted probability of supporting a
programme funded by public debt is 62 per cent among extreme left-wing
respondents but only 40 per cent among extreme right-wing respondents.
The opposite pattern can be observed for cuts in education and health. This
attribute strongly reduces support for the proposal among left-wing respon-
dents, but it has a neutral effect among right-wing respondents. The prob-
ability of supporting a programme funded through such cuts is just 17 per
cent for an extreme left-wing respondent, while it is 42 per cent among
extreme right-wing respondents.
A further noteworthy result is the heterogeneous effect of costs. Higher
costs reduce support for a policy proposal among right-wing respondents,
but not among left-wing respondents. For instance, increasing the cost of a
programme from 100 million to 3,000 million increases support for a proposal
from 49 per cent to 53 per cent among extreme left-wing respondents, but
decreases support from 56 per cent to 45 per cent among extreme right-
wing respondents. The difference in the marginal effects of the treatment
at the minimum and maximum values of ideology are signiﬁcant at the 95
per cent level (p = 0.04). In other words, even if the conﬁdence intervals
overlap, the interaction is clearly statistically signiﬁcant. We illustrate the mag-
nitude of the effects of increasing the costs of a programme from the
minimum to the maximum amount in Figure 2.7
In sum, our conjoint experiment allows us to disentangle which aspects of
LPM drive disagreement between the left and the right in Spain. On one hand,
there is a broad societal consensus in favour of more generous beneﬁts for the
Figure 2. Marginal effects of programme cost by respondent’s ideology.
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unemployed. Behind this broad consensus, however, there is disagreement
on funding. People with different ideologies disagree mostly on how much
money to devote to policies and how to pay for them. If LMP were free,
right-wing respondents would be happy to provide generous beneﬁts. But
social policies are expensive and our results suggest that opposition to
them is mostly driven by budgetary considerations among the right.
Conclusions
This article has argued that research into LMP preferences should take multi-
dimensionality more seriously. We addressed two questions: which policy
dimension is most important in determining support or rejection of reform
proposals; and do citizens differ in which policy dimension they prioritize?
The experiment revealed that funding plays a central but complex role in
shaping LMP support. We uncovered a nuanced portrait that may be obscured
when assessing preferences through traditional survey questions. To recapitu-
late, we found that: (a) most respondents want more spending on unemploy-
ment programmes; (b) averaging across all respondents, costs neither
increase nor decrease LMP support; (c) policy trade-offs matter: LMP
support plummets if it comes at the expense of a valued policy; (d) there is
consensus in favour of generous social policies across ideological orientations;
and (e) policy disagreements between the left and the right is driven by ques-
tions of funding and spending.
Our analysis has also shown that among different options to improve
beneﬁt generosity, support is highest for expanding beneﬁts targeted at
the very needy. This is a substantively important ﬁnding with direct relevance
for the policy-making process in Spain. It is particularly noteworthy against the
background of the alleged ‘paradox of redistribution’ that suggests less broad
support for targeted beneﬁts (Korpi and Palme 1998).
Our ﬁndings have several important implications. The widespread consen-
sus on more generous beneﬁts suggests that right-wing voters do not oppose
LMPs because they dislike recipients. They oppose them simply because LMPs
have to be paid for. A contextual factor might be that high unemployment
rates in Spain make it harder to blame LMP recipients, which renders them
more ‘deserving’ (Fernández-Albertos and Manzano 2012).
The ﬁnding that respondents are sensitive to spending trade-offs suggests
that politicians have considerable leverage to manipulate LMP support
through framing. Depending on the trade-off, citizens can be mobilized
against a programme (cuts in health and education) or in favour of it (cuts
in defence, higher debt, higher income tax). Overall, voters seem more
responsive to arguments about trade-offs than about absolute costs.
Another substantive discovery is that higher human-capital intensity gen-
erates only modest additional support. In contrast to academic and political
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hype around the social investment paradigm, the Spanish public seems scep-
tical about ALMPs. Given high unemployment even among university gradu-
ates, further training may simply not be seen as very promising in the Spanish
context. Another context-speciﬁc ﬁnding is that unions (who have been
accused of misappropriating training funds) are unpopular ALMP providers,
although it can generalize to contexts where trade unions are distrusted.
This is another directly relevant policy lesson.
An important null ﬁnding is that material self-interest does not help predict
the weight that respondents attach to different attributes of a programme.
Although Spain is a prime example of a dual labour market, employment
risk, income or skill level failed to show signiﬁcant differences in dimension
priorities. Our results indicate that, at least in the Spanish context, political
economy theories (e.g., Beramendi et al. 2015; Rueda 2006) overstate the
amount of conﬂict over LMPs between different social groups and they cast
doubts on the predictions of insider–outsider and dualization theory in par-
ticular. An important step forward in this literature would be to theorize
more explicitly how insider–outsider conﬂicts translate into dimension priori-
ties and to validate these theories empirically. As we have argued and shown,
conjoint experiments are a suitable tool for this endeavour.
Ideology turned out to be the more important moderator in our analysis.
However, it important to bear in mind that ideology and the socio-structural
variable studied in political economy cannot be directly juxtaposed. The
former is conceptually much closer to preferences, which means that in any
comparison of their explanatory power, the cards are stacked against the latter.
It is important to emphasize that experiments, as the one presented in this
article, are context dependent. Hence, there are clear limitations to the gen-
eralizability of our ﬁndings. First, we have studied LMP preferences in a
rather speciﬁc macro-economic context, namely post-crisis Spain. The devas-
tating labour market conditions could lead to a strong perception of the
unemployed as ‘deserving poor’ which might compress heterogeneity in pre-
ference and explain the strong support for targeted beneﬁts. Second, we have
focused on LMP expansion, but it might very well be that stronger differences
in the population surface if it has to decide on retrenching LMPs. Logical next
steps would therefore be to apply conjoint experiments in different countries
and to different policy choices. Third, it is plausible that economic self-interest
in Spain operates more on a household or family than on the individual level
and further research should explore this possibility.
Notes
1. We focus on LMP support rather than on preferences for redistribution. After all,
abstract principles such as redistribution have to be translated into concrete
policy proposals to become politically relevant.
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2. As elsewhere, not all of them are registered as unemployed.
3. We do not to propose cut-backs in order to avoid unrealistic combinations of
retrenchment and expansion of LMPs.
4. Interviews prior to the experiment show that respondents understood the impli-
cations of the options well and we provided supporting information for those in
doubt.
5. Power analyses suggest that our experiment has a sufﬁcient number of obser-
vations to ﬁnd even small treatment effects. See Hainmueller et al (2014) for a
discussion of statistical power in conjoint experiments.
6. Replications with controls for sociodemographic characteristics (age, gender,
religiosity, housing situation, citizenship), ideology and all the socioeconomic
characteristics reported in this analysis produce substantively similar results..
7. In the Online Appendix we present the full set of predicted probabilities to
support a programme at different values of costs and ideology.
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